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[A] 1. Introduction 
Debates surrounding free will are notorious for their intractability. This is so 
in spite of the fact that, even at a fairly fine grain of analysis, competing views on the 
nature of free will are well understood. Why can’t philosophers find common ground? 
One line of thought that has emerged fairly recently draws on the psychology of 
concepts. The general idea is that an explanation for persistent disagreement about 
free will, and perhaps guidance towards resolution, might be found by exploring the 
psychological roots of ‘our concept’ of free will – e.g., those psychological factors 
that underlie our tendencies to say, of some bit of human behavior, that it was 
performed of an agent’s own free will, or not. 
This very general idea has motivated very different proposals regarding the 
psychological roots of free will. I mention two examples. Shaun Nichols and Joshua 
Knobe (2007) appeal to a difference between responses to cases described abstractly 
and cases described concretely to argue that the appearance of compatibilist 
tendencies in applications of the concept free will – that is, attribution of free will to 
agents in deterministic universes – in fact represents an error. Concrete cases 
influence application tendencies by stimulating an affective response that biases the 
judgments. Unbiased applications of the concept, so goes the thought, are consistent 
with an incompatibilism between free will and determinism. In stark contrast, Dylan 
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Murray and Eddy Nahmias (2014) use mediation analysis over a range of concept 
applications (including free will and moral responsibility) to argue that the appearance 
of incompatibilist tendencies in fact represents an error. Instead of affirming 
incompatiblism as philosophers understand it, many people misinterpret determinism 
as implying the bypassing of the normal causal role played by an agent’s conscious 
mental states. Scrubbed of this mistake, the conceptual applications of most 
participants in experiments on free will are consistent with compatibilism.i 
Notice that these proposals can be taken to differ not only with respect to the 
descriptive facts regarding the psychological processes underlying free will 
judgments, but with respect to the more normative debate regarding what we might 
call the proper concept of free will. What both proposals share is the aim of using data 
about our concept to influence the traditional debate and the proper concept. To make 
good on this aim, it seems we need answers to two questions. First, what are the 
psychological roots of our concept of free will? Second, how might progress on the 
first question contribute to progress regarding normative debates about the proper 
concept of free will? 
In sections two and three I address the first question. Section two discusses 
recent work in the experimental philosophy of free will, and motivates the study I 
report in section three. Section four reflects on the second question in light of the 
reported results. To preview, the results suggest that the psychological structure of our 
concept of free will is sensitive to three independent features: Liberty, Ensurance, and 
Consciousness. I argue this supports the view that our concept is incompatibilist more 
than the view that our concept is compatibilist, and I discuss two proposals regarding 
the normative upshot. On one proposal, these results might be taken to offer some 
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support to incompatibilism about the proper concept. A second proposal, however, 
makes room for a much different upshot. 
 
[A] 2. Recent experimental philosophy of free will 
In a recent paper, Joshua May (2014) argues that the ‘ordinary’ concept of free 
will possesses ‘non-classical’ structure, in the sense that application conditions for 
this concept are not explicable in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions.ii 
Rather, application of free will is governed in a graded manner by unrelated features. 
May proposes two: what he calls Liberty and Ensurance. 
According to May, ‘an agent has Liberty in a situation just when she has at 
least two genuine options for action in that situation’ (2851). And ‘an agent has 
Ensurance with respect to an action just when the action depends in an appropriate 
way on her mental states and her environment’ (2851). These actual definitions are 
less important than the motivation behind positing these two general features. As May 
notes, Liberty is intuitively related to the incompatibilist insistence on the importance 
of indeterminism in the causal stream leading to free action. And Ensurance is 
intuitively related to the compatibilist insistence on the importance of control with 
respect to the causal stream leading to free action. On May’s proposal, both features 
play an important role in normal attributions of free will. 
 
When both [Liberty and Ensurance] appear to be present, free will is judged to 
be present. When both factors appear to be absent, free will is judged to be 
absent. When one but not the other factor is present, it is unclear whether or 
not free will is present. (2851) 
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In order to test this proposal, May designed vignettes that varied the presence or 
absence of Liberty and Ensurance. Liberty was varied via the following paragraph. 
 
Imagine there is a universe that is re-created over and over again, starting from 
the exact same initial conditions and with all the same laws of nature. In this 
universe the same initial conditions and the same laws of nature [needn’t/will] 
cause the exact same events for the entire history of the universe. So, every 
time the universe is re-created, [some things may not/everything will] happen 
the exact same way. 
 
Ensurance was varied via a story regarding an agent who deliberates and 
decides to steal a necklace. Normal deliberation and decision constituted the presence 
of Ensurance. The lack of Ensurance was emphasized via a causal route to action that 
involved brainwashing. When the agent lacked Ensurance, brainwashing gave her a 
powerful urge to steal the necklace, and the urge leads to the theft. 
One might worry whether May’s vignettes really measure the lack of 
Ensurance. Those vignettes introduce brainwashing, which may generate intuitions 
related to manipulation rather than simply the lack of Ensurance. May is aware of this 
problem, and argues that ‘attributions of free will are undermined by manipulation via 
lack of Ensurance’ (2860). This might be right. One way to make sure is to run 
vignettes that operationalize lack of Ensurance in some other way. I do so in the study 
reported in section three. 
As for May’s study, the results support his proposal. Both Liberty and 
Ensurance significantly impacted free will attributions, such that free will attribution 
was at its highest when both factors were present, and lowest when both were absent. 
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This is an interesting and important result. It indicates that application of free 
will is driven by features connected to the traditional dispute between incompatibilists 
and compatibilists. One might wonder, however, whether these are the only two 
relevant features. In connection with this question, further recent experimental work 
begs for attention. 
In recent experimental work of my own I have offered evidence that 
consciousness is, in certain respects, crucial to free will attribution. Consider, for 
example, study three from Shepherd (2012). In this study participants read vignettes 
that varied the presence or absence of determinism, as well as the presence or absence 
of consciousness in the causal stream leading to behavior. Both factors strongly 
influenced free will attributions, suggesting that conscious causation of behavior is as 
important for the normal view of free will as is indeterminism. 
Study three in Shepherd (2015) goes further than this. In this study 
participants read vignettes about ‘humanoid machines’ that behave indistinguishably 
from human beings. In one vignette these humanoids were described as conscious – 
the humanoids were said to ‘actually feel pain, experience emotions, see colors, and 
consciously deliberate about what to do’ (939). In a contrasting vignette the 
humanoids were said to lack consciousness. Although the behavior of both types of 
humanoids was described identically, the presence or absence of consciousness made 
a large difference for free will attributions. The conscious humanoid was deemed to 
have free will. The non-conscious humanoid was deemed to lack it. 
These studies suggest that in addition to Liberty and Ensurance, consciousness 
may be a third feature important for normal attributions of free will. Alternatively, it 
could be that consciousness is important for free will, but that its importance is largely 
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indirect. Perhaps, that is, consciousness is important for free will because it is 
important for Liberty or Ensurance. 
In section three I report a study that tests these possibilities. 
 
[A] 3. Liberty, Ensurance, Consciousness: A study 
We are interested in the relationship between consciousness, Liberty, and 
Ensurance as they relate to free will attribution. In order to test these relationships, I 
devised a study that independently varied all three factors (see appendix for the 
vignettes). This design allows, first, for a conceptual replication of May’s results. If 
Liberty and Ensurance are independently important for free will attributions, then we 
should see independent effects for both, as May did. Second, this design affords a test 
of various ways consciousness may be important for free will attribution. 
Consciousness may impact free will attribution independently, much as May’s 
results suggest Liberty and Ensurance do. If so, we should expect to see an 
independent effect of consciousness in the following study. Conversely, 
consciousness may impact free will attribution by tapping into deeper features within 
our concept of free will – e.g., by tapping into Liberty or Ensurance. If so, we should 
expect to see interactions between consciousness and Liberty and/or consciousness 
and Ensurance. Of course, these possibilities are not exclusive. We might find an 
independent effect for consciousness, as well as an interaction between consciousness 
and Liberty and/or Ensurance. 
 
[B] 3.1 Participants 
520 participants saw one of eight vignettes. Participants were recruited via 
Mechanical Turk and were paid $.45 for roughly 4-5 minutes of time. Participants 
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who failed a comprehension question or who failed to complete the survey were 
excluded from analysis. After exclusion, 456 participants remained (mean age = 34.9, 
gender = 57.2% male). 
 
[B] 3.2 Design 
Participants first read a paragraph, drawn from May’s study, that emphasized 
Liberty or its absence: 
 
Imagine there is a universe that is re-created over and over again, starting from 
the exact same initial conditions and with all the same laws of nature. In this 
universe the same initial conditions and the same laws of nature [needn’t/will] 
cause the exact same events for the entire history of the universe. So, every 
time the universe is re-created, [some things may not/everything will] happen 
the exact same way. 
 
They next read a paragraph that emphasized Consciousness or its absence: 
 
Consider a person, Mr. Q, living in this kind of universe (Universe 32). When 
Mr. Q gets angry, he sometimes utters horrible obscenities. Mr. Q does not 
like this about himself, and struggles to control it. But he sometimes fails. He 
has been to several psychologists and they assure him that the problem has to 
do with mechanisms of [non]conscious impulse control in his brain, 
mechanisms of which [he is consciously aware/he has no awareness]. If Mr. 
Q’s [non]conscious impulse control mechanisms are focused in the right way, 
he has enough control to refrain from uttering horrible obscenities. 
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Finally, participants read a paragraph that raised the possibility of Ensurance, 
and then specified whether Ensurance was present or absent. When Ensurance was 
present, the agent did what she really wanted to do, and refrained from uttering an 
obscenity. When Ensurance was absent, the agent uttered the obscenity. For example, 
here is a paragraph that holds the presence of Liberty and consciousness constant, and 
emphasizes Ensurance: 
 
Consider one incident in particular. At 10:41 a.m., Mr. Q’s boss says 
something that makes him angry. If Mr. Q utters an obscenity now, he will get 
fired. Does Mr. Q utter the obscenity or refrain? Two factors might be 
relevant. One, since Mr. Q lives in Universe 32, the initial conditions of the 
universe and the laws of nature do not determine what he will do. Two, there 
is the issue of whether Mr. Q’s conscious impulse control mechanisms are 
focused in the right way. As it happens, Mr. Q’s impulse control is 
consciously focused, and he refrains from uttering the obscenity. 
 
Participants then were asked to agree or disagree with the statement ‘Mr. Q 
[refrains/utters the obscenity] of his own free will.’ Answers were rated on a 1-7 
scale, where 1 represented ‘strongly disagree,’ 2 ‘disagree,’ 3 ‘somewhat disagree,’ 4 
‘neither agree nor disagree,’ 5 ‘somewhat agree,’ 6 ‘agree,’ and 7 ‘strongly agree.’ 
Finally, participants were asked what factors were relevant to their answer, and were 
given four options: 
 
(1) The fact that Mr. Q lives in Universe 32. 
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(2) The fact that Mr. Q’s impulse control mechanisms were [not] 
[non]consciously focused in the right way. 
(3) Both of the above factors. 
(4) None of the above factors. 
 
[B] 3.3 Results 
A 2x2x2 Analysis of Variance test revealed significant main effects for 
Liberty, F(1,456) = 63.911, p<.001, partial eta squared=.125, for Ensurance, F(1,456) 
= 19.004, p<.001, partial eta squared=.041, and for Consciousness, F(1,456) = 23.164, 
partial eta squared=.049. There were no significant interactions, although an 
interaction between Consciousness and Ensurance approached significance (p=.079). 
The means for each vignette are represented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Means by vignette. 
Liberty+/Ensurance+/Consciousness+ M = 5.51, SD = 1.29 
(N=55) 
Liberty+/Ensurance+/Consciousness- M = 4.63, SD = 1.69 
(N=54) 
Liberty+/Ensurance-/Consciousness+ M = 4.76, SD = 1.57 
(N=54) 
Liberty+/Ensurance-/Consciousness- M = 4.45, SD = 1.61 
(N=64) 
Liberty-/Ensurance+/Consciousness+ M = 4.61, SD = 1.71 
(N=57) 
Liberty-/Ensurance+/Consciousness- M = 3.49, SD = 1.70 
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(N=59) 
Liberty-/Ensurance-/Consciousness+ M = 3.50, SD = 1.80 
(N=56) 
Liberty-/Ensurance-/Consciousness- M = 2.88, SD = 1.57 
(N=57) 
 
Regarding which factors were reported as relevant to free will attributions, I 
computed the percentage of responses by case. These are represented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Reported reasons for judgment by vignette. Factor 1 = [In]determinism; 
Factor 2 = [Non]Consciousness; Factor 3 = Both Factors 1 and 2; Factor 4 = Neither 
Factors 1, 2, nor 3. 
Liberty+/Ensurance+/Consciousness+ 1 = 3.6%, 2 = 58.2%, 3 = 34.5%, 4 = 
3.6% 
Liberty+/Ensurance+/Consciousness- 1 = 7.4%, 2 = 53.7%, 3 = 33.3%, 4 = 
5.6% 
Liberty+/Ensurance-/Consciousness+ 1 = 13.0%, 2 = 48.1%, 3 = 35.2%, 4 = 
3.7% 
Liberty+/Ensurance-/Consciousness- 1 = 3.1%, 2 = 56.3%, 3 = 34.4%, 4 = 
6.3% 
Liberty-/Ensurance+/Consciousness+ 1 = 22.8%, 2 = 31.6%, 3 = 42.1%, 4 = 
3.5% 
Liberty-/Ensurance+/Consciousness- 1 = 22.0%, 2 = 18.6%, 3 = 57.6%, 4 = 
1.7% 
Liberty-/Ensurance-/Consciousness+ 1 = 25.0%, 2 = 21.4%, 3 = 51.8%, 4 = 
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1.8% 
Liberty-/Ensurance-/Consciousness- 1 = 28.1%, 2 = 15.8%, 3 = 56.1%, 4 = 
0.0% 
 
Visual inspection of the data suggests an interesting shift with respect to 
Liberty. When Liberty is present, participants rarely cited the fact that the agent lived 
in an indeterministic universe as relevant to their free will attribution. But when 
Liberty was absent, this changed. A post-hoc chi squared test confirmed that the 
influence of Liberty on which factor was selected was statistically significant X2 (3, N 
= 456) = 66.27, p<.001. Neither Ensurance nor Consciousness significantly impacted 
selection (ps>.75). 
 
[B] 3.4 Discussion 
These results offer a conceptual replication of those reported by May (2014), 
while avoiding worries about manipulation that might problematize his results. Both 
Liberty and Ensurance are relevant to free will attribution. In addition, these results go 
beyond those reported by May, by demonstrating that Consciousness is a third, 
independent factor relevant to free will attribution. In general, when all three of these 
features are present, free will is attributed at a high level. Take any one of these 
features away, and answers reflect some uncertainty about the presence of free will. If 
two features are absent, free will attribution tends to be withheld. If all three are 
absent, this tendency is further increased. 
Recall that May put his results to work in support of an explanation for the 




The cluster concept account is meant to help explain the long-standing debate 
about free will and determinism. It is undoubtedly bold to do this, and I 
accordingly wish to tread lightly. Nevertheless, we arguably have good 
empirical and ‘armchair’ reasons for the idea that the concept of free will is 
not associated with a single feature that is either compatible with determinism 
or not. Rather Ensurance and Liberty both play an important role in the 
concept of free will. (2865) 
 
The co-importance of Liberty and Ensurance certainly suggests an 
explanation. Filling that explanation out, however, requires far more than these results 
show.iii That is to say, I find it plausible that there is some intuitive conflict in our 
very notion of free will. Indeed, when given the right kinds of cases, I can feel the 
conflict within myself. But certainly many other factors – arguably involving the 
influence of particular philosophers and particular arguments, as well as intellectual 
currents within philosophy and within the culture more broadly at any given historical 
moment – have contributed to the nature and structure of free will debates as they 
have developed over time. 
I turn to a different issue. The fact that application of the concept of free will 
is driven by Ensurance, Liberty and Consciousness might be taken to conflict with a 
recent theory of free will attribution. Murray and Nahmias (2014) argue that most 
people lack intuitions in favor of incompatibilism, and that attributions of free will 
that appear incompatibilist can be explained by way of an error theory. According to 
Murray and Nahmias, non-philosophers misinterpret descriptions of determinism as 
implying bypassing of those (conscious) mental states, events and processes normally 
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thought to be relevant for free action. When reading vignettes regarding action in 
deterministic universes, non-philosophers falsely infer that an agent’s mental states, 
events, and processes ‘have no causal effect’ on their behavior (2014, 440). 
If Murray and Nahmias are right, one would predict different results than 
those found here. First, one would predict that Liberty would not have an effect 
independent of that produced by Consciousness. For once the causal importance of 
Consciousness is properly emphasized, one would think that most participants would 
not be inclined to mistake determinism for bypassing. Second, one would predict that 
participants attributing low levels of free will in deterministic, non-conscious 
scenarios would tend to blame the absence of Consciousness, rather than the absence 
of Liberty. But this is not what we find. Instead, we find that participants cite Liberty 
as important to their judgment at significantly higher rates when cases involve 
determinism, even when these cases also emphasize the absence of consciousness. 
There is a further problem for Murray and Nahmias. Although their bypassing 
hypothesis is strictly silent on the factors influencing free will attribution in 
indeterministic cases, their overarching aim is to argue that the folk are compatibilists. 
If so, one would expect that a high percentage of participants who see indeterministic 
cases would cite Consciousness, but not Liberty, as the reason for their attribution of 
free will. While a high percentage of participants did cite Consciousness in such 
cases, over 40% cited Liberty as among their reasons. So a substantial percentage of 
participants offer justifications that are explicitly incompatibillist. And those that did 
not offer justifications that are consistent with incompatibilism. 
In connection with this last point, philosophical libertarians – those who 
affirm an incompatibillism between free will and determinism, and assert that we 
have free will – may wish to press the following point. As May and I have introduced 
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it, Ensurance is supposed to closely track features that motivate compatibilism. But is 
this correct? May’s operationalization of Ensurance involved action success when 
Ensurance was present, and brainwashing when Ensurance was absent. With respect 
to this operationalization, libertarians are likely to complain that their best theories 
rule out free will in brainwashing cases as well. So May’s results regarding Ensurance 
support folk libertarianism as much as folk compatibillism. My operationalization of 
Ensurance was different, contrasting action caused in part by effective impulse 
control in one case with action caused in part by ineffective impulse control in 
another. Again, however, many libertarians will agree that an agent is not free, or is 
perhaps less free, when her control over her action is in some way compromised. This 
is because indeterminism is merely a necessary condition on free will. As Widerker 
and Schnall recently put the point: 
 
For a libertarian, indeterminism per se neither undermines free agency, nor 
renders an action free. Rather, it is a condition that makes the performance of 
free action possible, a condition that makes room, or provides the opportunity, 
for the exercise of free agency. (2015, 94) 
 
These are fair points. In my view, the results reported above support the claim 
that the folk are incompatibilists more than the claim that the folk are compatibilists. 
Whether the support is strong enough to move the normative needle regarding the 
structure of the proper concept of free will is less transparent. For the relationship 
between information regarding the psychological structure of our concept of free will, 
and the view we ought to adopt regarding the proper concept of free will, is complex. 
In response to the libertarian, the compatibilist may well reemphasize some of the 
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many arguments against the cogency of any incompatibilist view. One such argument 
appeals to the need for an absence of luck in free action. The enterprising 
compatibilist might make a case that the importance of Ensurance – as I have 
operationalized it – provides an intuitive strand in our concept of free will upon which 
absence of luck arguments can build. For the enterprising compatibilist, then, the 
proper concept of free will may turn out to be compatibilist, once we have cleansed 
the folk concept of its undesirable incompatibilist elements. 
Here I am simply pointing out the existence of dialectical strategies left open 
by the results reported here. More specificity regarding how we ought to proceed 
requires greater clarity on the question I elucidated above. How might progress in our 
understanding of the psychological roots of (our concept of) free will contribute to 
progress regarding normative debates about the proper concept of free will? In the 
next section, I offer an appraisal of answers to this question. 
 
[A] 4. Putting x-phi to metaphysical work 
X-phi was once – for some, probably still is – associated with the striking 
image of a burning armchair. Perhaps more than any particular argument, this image 
gave philosophers the impression that x-phi’s philosophical value had to do with the 
destruction of a kind of orthodoxy. That orthodoxy sees philosophy as centrally (even 
if not exclusively) concerned with the clarification and analysis of concepts, and as 
centrally (even if not exclusively) committed to a particular methodology for doing 
so. This methodology is sometimes called the method of cases, and consists in part of 
considering a wide range of thought experiments, offering intuitions or judgments 
about these cases, and thereby collecting a kind of data to which philosophical 
theories and analyses must in some way answer. 
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It is no longer clear that this is, or ever was, the best way to understand x-phi’s 
philosophical value. It is true that proponents of the so-called negative program 
(Alexander et al. 2010) seek to undermine a kind of over-reliance on intuitions. The 
influence of that program has, in my view, been largely salutary. For example, 
philosophers are now more self-critical when deploying the method of cases, and 
more aware of psychological factors that can lead to biased judgments (e.g., order 
effects). But beyond the negative program, recent reflection on the positive value of 
x-phi has generated more than one interesting proposal. In the remainder of this 
section, I consider two such proposals, and reflect on the ways such proposals might 
illuminate the use of data regarding free will judgments in debates about the proper 
concept of free will. 
One proposal is due to Uriah Kriegel, writing in this volume. Kriegel argues 
that x-phi can and should contribute to the kind of philosophical program Frank 
Jackson calls ‘serious metaphysics.’ As Jackson has it, a major aim of philosophy is 
the development of a total theory of the world in terms of fundamental and derivative 
statements and notions, and in terms of entailment relations between fundamental and 
derivative statements and notions. Conceptual analysis plays a crucial role in the 
development of such a theory, since many of the relevant statements, notions, and 
entailments go well beyond any formal structure the theory will possess. 
On Kriegel’s proposal, the kind of conceptual analysis needed elucidates the 
meaning of a concept by mapping platitudes about the concept (drawn from 
commonsense and/or scientific inquiry) into variations of the Ramsey sentence. The 
variation called for may depend upon particulars of the concept. In response to 
criticisms of this methodology, Kriegel offers a few alternatives. One interesting 
alternative, offered in response to Quine’s rejection of the analytic/synthetic 
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distinction, Kriegel calls this the Lewis sentence. A concept analyzed via a Lewis 
sentence need not contain any nonnegotiable platitude, for a Lewis sentence consists 
of a disjunction of conjunctions of most platitudes. Of course, we could package in 
nonnegotiability by including one or more platitude in every disjunct, but we need 
not. Further, as Kriegel notes, ‘we can imagine a Lewis sentence in which some 
platitudes appear in many more disjuncts than others. This would reflect their greater 
centrality or ‘weight’ within the concept’ (17). 
Kriegel’s point in discussing various ways to formulate analyses via Ramsey 
sentences is to illustrate, and demonstrate, just how flexible serious metaphysics-style 
conceptual analysis can be.iv How does this relate to x-phi? Kriegel claims that ‘our 
concepts are much more complex and flexible than traditional conceptual analaysis 
has assumed,’ (22) with the following interesting result. 
 
The great majority of concepts, I suspect, are such as to require extraordinarily 
complex Ramsey sentences to capture. Their capturing is a sort of labor-
intensive conceptual analysis. My suggestion is that the rationale for 
experimentalization is the need for this kind of labor-intensive conceptual 
analysis. Given the complexity of most of our concepts, capturing their 
psychological structure in full detail would require a multitude of teams of 
researchers working in parallel to (a) produce hypotheses about aspects of 
Ramsey sentences, (b) devise the thought experiments that could test the 
hypotheses, and (c) implement the tests through the familiar social-
psychological-style questionnaires presented to the right kinds of subject. (23) 
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As Kriegel no doubt recognizes, when practicing labor-intensive conceptual 
analysis, the analyst will come to face difficult decisions. Which platitudes should we 
regard as central, and which as peripheral? How are we to decide if some concept 
contains a nonnegotiable element? And so on. Kriegel says little about how the 
theorist might find guidance with respect to such decisions, but presumably, given the 
background motivations of serious metaphysics, fidelity to widespread intuitions or 
conceptual applications across various cases will be important. Given this 
presumption, evidence of the sort presented above might be taken to support an 
incompatibilist analysis of free will. On such an analysis, an incompatibility between 
free will and determinism will take central stage, while considerations closer to the 
compatibilist’s heart will be pushed towards the periphery. 
This understanding of the relationship between our concept and the proper 
concept is in line with that of many philosophers of action, and also with what many 
take to be a primary motivation for engaging in the experimental philosophy of free 
will. A different view, however, is available. 
In a paper co-written with James Justus, he and I offer the following five 
contributions x-phi makes to conceptual understanding. 
 
X-phi can (i) uncover regions of vagueness in extensions and intensions of 
concepts . . . (ii) reveal instances of conceptual pluralism underlying a notion . 
. . (iii) discover sources of bias that influence intuitions . . . (iv) discover 
unpredictable influences on conceptual judgments . . . (v) outline a concept’s 
central features and its dependence relationships with other concepts. (390) 
 
	 19	
These are all contributions that would, it seems, be equally welcome to the 
Kriegelian practicing labor-intensive conceptual analysis. And yet we present these 
contributions as constituting ‘a key element in a defensible contemporary alternative 
to conceptual analysis,’ an element they call explication preparation (390). The term 
explication is due to Rudolph Carnap (1950), who argued that theoretical progress in 
science often requires some measure of conceptual revision, usually in the direction of 
increased precision or simplicity. Regarding Carnap’s motivation, we comment: 
‘Prioritizing precision and fruitfulness over strict preservation of conceptual content 
reflects methodology in science and as the unparalleled exemplar of epistemic success 
in human inquiry Carnap thought philosophy should follow suit’ (388). 
Justus and I offer Carnap-style pragmatic arguments in favor of the explication 
of concepts with straightforwardly empirical content, as well as the concepts that 
concern formal epistemologists. We do not speculate regarding concepts with 
explicitly moral or otherwise value-laden content, nor do they consider the possibility 
that some concepts – perhaps free will is an example, due to its intimate connections 
with moral responsibility – might have content that is both empirical and in some 
sense normative. Nonetheless, it is hard to deny that scientific and philosophical 
theory-building bears two features we repeatedly emphasize. First, when theory-
building there is a frequent need to move beyond the kind of content implicit in the 
patterns folk (or even specialist) intuitions indicate. Second, when making such a 
move some justification must be offered. Carnap, and accordingly Justus and I, 
emphasize higher-level theoretical justifications, such as fruitfulness in ensuring 
empirical adequacy and in generating accurate predictions. 
Kriegel’s proposal on the one hand, and Justus’s and mine on the other, differ 
with respect to the metaphysical pictures that animate them. Kriegel appeals to the 
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serious metaphysics of the Canberra Plan. We appeal to the deflationary metaphysics 
of Carnap. Even so, these two proposals appear to share the following features. On 
either proposal one will need to make difficult choices between various ways to 
elucidate a concept’s potentially quite complex structure. Accordingly, on either 
proposal one will need guidance, and one will need some justification for the choices 
made. Here various other features of normal philosophical practice are likely to come 
into play – arguments that appeal to formal coherence, or to background metaphysical 
pictures, that give weight to one element of a concept over another, that reinterpret 
one element of a concept in the name of overall plausibility, or theoretical unity, or 
reflective equilibrium, or whatever. The two proposals I have considered may place 
weight at very different places when making such decisions, but they need not. As 
Justus and I comment, 
 
[T]he contribution x-phi makes will not determine, in any particular case, how 
explication should go. Explicative choices (e.g., choices about which features 
of concepts to preserve and which to abandon) will be guided in part by 
theoretical aims particular to the case at hand. (391) 
 
We emphasize not only the guidance one’s context-sensitive theoretical aims 
can provide, but also the fact that, for Carnap, fidelity to a concept’s intuitive content 
was far less important than that the conceptual structures produced by explication 
serve one’s aims. This last emphasis raises a distinct possibility. Depending on how 
the arguments go, it may be fruitful for an analysis to leave behind elements of our 
concept of free will. 
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This possibility is explicitly advanced by Manuel Vargas (2013), who argues 
that no matter our concept of free will, the proper concept is one that leaves our 
concept behind – that changes its content – for reasons proprietary to moral theory. 
According to Vargas, our concept of free will contains certain conflicting strands: ‘we 
have diverse intuitions, and some of those intuitions are plausibly understood as 
compatibilist, and others as incompatibilist’ (22). Furthermore, the way forward is not 
to attempt to capture the complex structure of our concept as accurately as possible, 
but rather to revise our concept in ways that promote a system of moral responsibility 
practices that promote morally governed agency. 
Now, whether Vargas’s revision (we might call it explication) of FREE WILL 
ought to be accepted depends on a wide range of considerations. We should debate 
whether the needs of moral theory (or, indeed, of practical life) should guide 
conceptual revision in the way Vargas indicates. We should debate whether anything 
is lost in such explicit rejection of our concept. These are debates we can and will 
have no matter the psychological structure of free will. 
This is not to say, however, that empirical work on the psychology of free will 
be irrelevant to these debates. Indeed, given the complexity inherent in our concept of 
free will, it looks as though these debates will be difficult to have without much more 
in the way of empirical work and psychological theorizing regarding the structure of 
our concept of free will, and much more in the way of effort mapping this structure to 
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Appendix 
Liberty + / Ensurance + / Consciousness + 
Imagine there is a universe that is re-created over and over again, starting from the 
exact same initial conditions and with all the same laws of nature. In this universe the 
same initial conditions and the same laws of nature needn’t cause the exact same 
events for the entire history of the universe. So, every time the universe is re-created, 
some things may not happen the exact same way. 
 
Consider a person, Mr. Q, living in this kind of universe (Universe 32). When Mr. Q 
gets angry, he sometimes utters horrible obscenities. Mr. Q does not like this about 
himself, and struggles to control it. But he sometimes fails. He has been to several 
psychologists and they assure him that the problem has to do with mechanisms of 
conscious impulse control in his brain, mechanisms of which he is consciously aware. 
If Mr. Q’s conscious impulse control mechanisms are focused in the right way, he has 
enough control to refrain from uttering horrible obscenities. 
 
Consider one incident in particular. At 10:41 a.m., Mr. Q’s boss says something that 
makes him angry. If Mr. Q utters an obscenity now, he will get fired. Does Mr. Q 
utter the obscenity or refrain? Two factors might be relevant. One, since Mr. Q lives 
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in Universe 32, the initial conditions of the universe and the laws of nature do not 
determine what he will do. Two, there is the issue of whether Mr. Q’s conscious 
impulse control mechanisms are focused in the right way. 
 
As it happens, Mr. Q’s impulse control is consciously focused, and he refrains from 
uttering the obscenity. 
 
 
Liberty + / Ensurance + / Consciousness - 
Imagine there is a universe that is re-created over and over again, starting from the 
exact same initial conditions and with all the same laws of nature. In this universe the 
same initial conditions and the same laws of nature needn’t cause the exact same 
events for the entire history of the universe. So, every time the universe is re-created, 
some things may not happen the exact same way. 
 
Consider a person, Mr. Q, living in this kind of universe (Universe 32). When Mr. Q 
gets angry, he sometimes utters horrible obscenities. Mr. Q does not like this about 
himself, and struggles to control it. But he sometimes fails. He has been to several 
psychologists and they assure him that the problem has to do with mechanisms of 
non-conscious impulse control in his brain, mechanisms of which he has no conscious 
awareness. If Mr. Q’s conscious impulse control mechanisms are focused in the right 
way, he has enough control to refrain from uttering horrible obscenities. 
 
Consider one incident in particular. At 10:41 a.m., Mr. Q’s boss says something that 
makes him angry. If Mr. Q utters an obscenity now, he will get fired. Does Mr. Q 
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utter the obscenity or refrain? Two factors might be relevant. One, since Mr. Q lives 
in Universe 32, the initial conditions of the universe and the laws of nature do not 
determine what he will do. Two, there is the issue of whether Mr. Q’s non-conscious 
impulse control mechanisms are focused in the right way. 
 
As it happens, Mr. Q’s impulse control is non-consciously focused, and he refrains 
from uttering the obscenity. 
 
 
Liberty + / Ensurance - / Consciousness + 
Imagine there is a universe that is re-created over and over again, starting from the 
exact same initial conditions and with all the same laws of nature. In this universe the 
same initial conditions and the same laws of nature needn’t cause the exact same 
events for the entire history of the universe. So, every time the universe is re-created, 
some things may not happen the exact same way. 
 
Consider a person, Mr. Q, living in this kind of universe (Universe 32). When Mr. Q 
gets angry, he sometimes utters horrible obscenities. Mr. Q does not like this about 
himself, and struggles to control it. But he sometimes fails. He has been to several 
psychologists and they assure him that the problem has to do with mechanisms of 
conscious impulse control in his brain, mechanisms of which he is consciously aware. 
If Mr. Q’s conscious impulse control mechanisms are focused in the right way, he has 
enough control to refrain from uttering horrible obscenities. 
 
	 26	
Consider one incident in particular. At 10:41 a.m., Mr. Q’s boss says something that 
makes him angry. If Mr. Q utters an obscenity now, he will get fired. Does Mr. Q 
utter the obscenity or refrain? Two factors might be relevant. One, since Mr. Q lives 
in Universe 32, the initial conditions of the universe and the laws of nature do not 
determine what he will do. Two, there is the issue of whether Mr. Q’s conscious 
impulse control mechanisms are focused in the right way. 
 




Liberty + / Ensurance - / Consciousness – 
Imagine there is a universe that is re-created over and over again, starting from the 
exact same initial conditions and with all the same laws of nature. In this universe the 
same initial conditions and the same laws of nature needn’t cause the exact same 
events for the entire history of the universe. So, every time the universe is re-created, 
some things may not happen the exact same way. 
 
Consider a person, Mr. Q, living in this kind of universe (Universe 32). When Mr. Q 
gets angry, he sometimes utters horrible obscenities. Mr. Q does not like this about 
himself, and struggles to control it. But he sometimes fails. He has been to several 
psychologists and they assure him that the problem has to do with mechanisms of 
non-conscious impulse control in his brain, mechanisms of which he has no conscious 
awareness. If Mr. Q’s conscious impulse control mechanisms are focused in the right 
way, he has enough control to refrain from uttering horrible obscenities. 
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Consider one incident in particular. At 10:41 a.m., Mr. Q’s boss says something that 
makes him angry. If Mr. Q utters an obscenity now, he will get fired. Does Mr. Q 
utter the obscenity or refrain? Two factors might be relevant. One, since Mr. Q lives 
in Universe 32, the initial conditions of the universe and the laws of nature do not 
determine what he will do. Two, there is the issue of whether Mr. Q’s non-conscious 
impulse control mechanisms are focused in the right way. 
 





Liberty - / Ensurance + / Consciousness + 
Imagine there is a universe that is re-created over and over again, starting from the 
exact same initial conditions and with all the same laws of nature. In this universe the 
same initial conditions and the same laws of nature will cause the exact same events 
for the entire history of the universe. So, every time the universe is re-created, 
everything will happen the exact same way. 
 
Consider a person, Mr. Q, living in this kind of universe (Universe 32). When Mr. Q 
gets angry, he sometimes utters horrible obscenities. Mr. Q does not like this about 
himself, and struggles to control it. But he sometimes fails. He has been to several 
psychologists and they assure him that the problem has to do with mechanisms of 
conscious impulse control in his brain, mechanisms of which he is consciously aware. 
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If Mr. Q’s conscious impulse control mechanisms are focused in the right way, he has 
enough control to refrain from uttering horrible obscenities. 
 
Consider one incident in particular. At 10:41 a.m., Mr. Q’s boss says something that 
makes him angry. If Mr. Q utters an obscenity now, he will get fired. Does Mr. Q 
utter the obscenity or refrain? Two factors might be relevant. One, since Mr. Q lives 
in Universe 32, the initial conditions of the universe and the laws of nature determine 
what he will do. Two, there is the issue of whether Mr. Q’s conscious impulse control 
mechanisms are focused in the right way. 
 
As it happens, Mr. Q’s impulse control is consciously focused, and he refrains from 
uttering the obscenity. 
 
 
Liberty - / Ensurance + / Consciousness – 
Imagine there is a universe that is re-created over and over again, starting from the 
exact same initial conditions and with all the same laws of nature. In this universe the 
same initial conditions and the same laws of nature will cause the exact same events 
for the entire history of the universe. So, every time the universe is re-created, 
everything will happen the exact same way. 
 
Consider a person, Mr. Q, living in this kind of universe (Universe 32). When Mr. Q 
gets angry, he sometimes utters horrible obscenities. Mr. Q does not like this about 
himself, and struggles to control it. But he sometimes fails. He has been to several 
psychologists and they assure him that the problem has to do with mechanisms of 
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non-conscious impulse control in his brain, mechanisms of which he has no conscious 
awareness. If Mr. Q’s non-conscious impulse control mechanisms are focused in the 
right way, he has enough control to refrain from uttering horrible obscenities. 
 
Consider one incident in particular. At 10:41 a.m., Mr. Q’s boss says something that 
makes him angry. If Mr. Q utters an obscenity now, he will get fired. Does Mr. Q 
utter the obscenity or refrain? Two factors might be relevant. One, since Mr. Q lives 
in Universe 32, the initial conditions of the universe and the laws of nature determine 
what he will do. Two, there is the issue of whether Mr. Q’s non-conscious impulse 
control mechanisms are focused in the right way. 
 
As it happens, Mr. Q’s impulse control is non-consciously focused, and he refrains 
from uttering the obscenity. 
 
 
Liberty - / Ensurance - / Consciousness + 
Imagine there is a universe that is re-created over and over again, starting from the 
exact same initial conditions and with all the same laws of nature. In this universe the 
same initial conditions and the same laws of nature will cause the exact same events 
for the entire history of the universe. So, every time the universe is re-created, 
everything will happen the exact same way. 
 
Consider a person, Mr. Q, living in this kind of universe (Universe 32). When Mr. Q 
gets angry, he sometimes utters horrible obscenities. Mr. Q does not like this about 
himself, and struggles to control it. But he sometimes fails. He has been to several 
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psychologists and they assure him that the problem has to do with mechanisms of 
conscious impulse control in his brain, mechanisms of which he is consciously aware. 
If Mr. Q’s conscious impulse control mechanisms are focused in the right way, he has 
enough control to refrain from uttering horrible obscenities. 
 
Consider one incident in particular. At 10:41 a.m., Mr. Q’s boss says something that 
makes him angry. If Mr. Q utters an obscenity now, he will get fired. Does Mr. Q 
utter the obscenity or refrain? Two factors might be relevant. One, since Mr. Q lives 
in Universe 32, the initial conditions of the universe and the laws of nature determine 
what he will do. Two, there is the issue of whether Mr. Q’s conscious impulse control 
mechanisms are focused in the right way. 
 





Liberty - / Ensurance - / Consciousness – 
Imagine there is a universe that is re-created over and over again, starting from the 
exact same initial conditions and with all the same laws of nature. In this universe the 
same initial conditions and the same laws of nature will cause the exact same events 
for the entire history of the universe. So, every time the universe is re-created, 
everything will happen the exact same way. 
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Consider a person, Mr. Q, living in this kind of universe (Universe 32). When Mr. Q 
gets angry, he sometimes utters horrible obscenities. Mr. Q does not like this about 
himself, and struggles to control it. But he sometimes fails. He has been to several 
psychologists and they assure him that the problem has to do with mechanisms of 
non-conscious impulse control in his brain, mechanisms of which he has no conscious 
awareness. If Mr. Q’s conscious impulse control mechanisms are focused in the right 
way, he has enough control to refrain from uttering horrible obscenities. 
 
Consider one incident in particular. At 10:41 a.m., Mr. Q’s boss says something that 
makes him angry. If Mr. Q utters an obscenity now, he will get fired. Does Mr. Q 
utter the obscenity or refrain? Two factors might be relevant. One, since Mr. Q lives 
in Universe 32, the initial conditions of the universe and the laws of nature determine 
what he will do. Two, there is the issue of whether Mr. Q’s non-conscious impulse 
control mechanisms are focused in the right way. 
 
As it happens, Mr. Q’s impulse control is not non-consciously focused, and he utters 
the obscenity. 
																																								 																				
i	Both	proposals	have	been	challenged.	For	a	response	to	Nichols	and	Knobe,	see	Sosa	(2007).	For	a	
response	to	Murray	and	Nahmias,	see	Rose	and	Nichols	(2013).	
ii	A	referee	correctly	notes	that	the	standard	view	in	cognitive	science	is	that	very	few	concepts	have	
classical	structure,	and	thus	that	what	is	of	interest	here	are	the	particular	features	that	influence	
applications	of	the	concept	free	will.	
iii	In	connection	with	this	point,	one	might	wonder	why,	given	the	presence	of	a	third	co-important	
feature	within	the	psychological	structure	of	our	concept	of	free	will	(namely,	consciousness),	there	is	
no	corresponding	traditional	view	regarding	free	will.	
iv	A	second	interesting	alternative	on	the	Ramsey	sentence	–	called	a	(mega)Lewis	sentence	–	is	
introduced	in	response	to	the	idea	that	some	concepts	contain	a	conditional	structure.	See	Kriegel	for	
discussion.	
